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The Prime Minister has no Scottish strategy and is at the
mercy of events
Alan Convery argues that the Tories have failed to outline a vision for Scotland’s place
within the United Kingdom and thus Conservative policy on Scotland is constantly subject to
ad hoc adjustments. If they want to get on the front foot, Conservatives need to think about
what type of devolution they want Scotland to have.
Where does the Conservative Party see Scotland in 10 years? The f act that it has no
answer beyond ‘not independent’ means that it is constantly reacting to events, rather
than setting the agenda. In contrast with its ideas about localism and elected mayors in
England, the Conservative Party has thus f ar f ailed to think strategically about how devolution could be
ref ormed in a manner which suits its electoral and polit ical interests.
The Conservatives played a f ull part in the Calman Commission on Scottish devolution which
recommended f urther powers f or the Scottish Parliament. Distancing themselves f rom the report’s
conclusions could have reinf orced the impression that the Conservatives were anti-Scottish.
However, support f or the Calman proposals and the subsequent Scotland Bill has not translated into a
coherent Conservative approach to the challenge of  devolution. In the event it did not do much to
improve the Conservatives’ image in Scotland; nor did it demonstrate a set of  principles which the
Conservatives were applying to Scotland in order to f urther their interests and keep the United Kingdom
together. It was an obvious and easy way to f ill a gap in polit ical thinking: granting relatively painless
concessions f rom the centre but f inding the strategy inadequate when it is overtaken by events.
The Prime Minister thus f ound himself  in a posit ion of  championing a Bill which received lukewarm
support f rom all quarters: the SNP saw it as a f irst step; unionist-minded Conservatives in Scotland
disliked the transf er of  powers but saw it as the price of  looking ‘pro-Scottish’; and more radical voices
on the centre-right in Scotland (and England) thought the f iscal powers did not go f ar enough to deal
with English resentment or Scottish dependency.
The measures in the Scotland Bill were swif t ly overtaken by the election of  an SNP majority government
in 2011. This called into question the Conservatives’ entire strategy towards Scotland and guaranteed a
ref erendum on independence. The Prime Minister ’s response has predictably been to make speeches
def ending the Union. What he has not chosen to do is outline a vision f or Scotland’s place within the
United Kingdom. This means that policy tends to be rewritten every time the Prime Minister visits.
The most egregious example of  this occurred in February 2012 and captures many of  the polit ical
dangers of  Cameron’s approach. In a speech to business leaders in Edinburgh  the Prime Minister said
that ‘when the ref erendum is over, I am open to looking at how the devolution settlement can be
improved f urther. And, yes, this does mean considering what f urther powers could be devolved’. This was
interpreted in Scotland as a new posit ion f or the Conservative Party.
It also appeared not to have been cleared with Ruth Davidson, the leader of  the Scottish Conservatives,
who promised during her election campaign that the Scotland Bill was a ‘line in the sand’ in terms of
f urther powers. The remark also prompted unf lattering comparisons with similar comments by Sir Alec
Douglas-Home ahead of  the 1979 devolution ref erendum. He also promised that a negative ref erendum
result would not take devolution of f  the agenda.
It immediately begged questions about what exactly the Prime Minister was proposing. Would he be
outlining these new powers? Was this approach agreed with the Scottish party? Would these powers f all
short of  f ull f iscal autonomy? It appeared that the Prime Minister himself  did not know. Nor, it appears,
had he been advised about the consequences of  outlining a signif icant change in policy on Scotland
without preparing the ground or thinking about the implications. Conservative policy on Scotland is thus
constantly subject to ad hoc adjustments, to burnish the main argument of  a speech or to help with
appearing relaxed about Scottish aspirations. It does not emerge out of  a strategy to make the Scottish
sense of  nationhood work f or Conservative interests.
If  they want to get on the f ront f oot in terms of  the Scottish Question, the Conservatives need to think
about what type of  devolution they want Scotland to have. It is not dif f icult to see how the Conservative
Party could f ruitf ully engage with ideas about Devo Plus, f ederalism and f urthering localism by
acknowledging the territorial dimension.
This would, however, require a deeper commitment to constitutional thinking that the Prime Minister has
yet displayed. Having just embarked upon a battle over House of  Lords ref orm, Mr Cameron could
perhaps be f orgiven f or not wanting to open up a second f ront about devolution. Nevertheless
maintaining a studied ambiguity about a post-ref erendum Scotland is a high-risk strategy f or maintaining
the Union.
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